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questions of language and law’. In, Sadakazu Fujii et al (eds.), Praxis of Language, 6 volumes 
(University of Tokyo Press, 2002). Volume 5: ‘Politics’, edited by Hidetaka Ishida and Yoichi 





I do not call myself a forensic linguist. I neither object to the use of the term 
nor particularly care whether or not I am called one. The fact is, I consider 
myself a linguist who, in this instance, happens to be carrying out his analysis 
on data that grows out of a court case. I see no reason to add the word forensic, 
which is a description of the data and the area in which a language problem 
resides.[....] in any case, the word forensic conjures up images of morgues, 
cadavers, and death. (Shuy, 1993:200) 
 
This is how American discourse analyst Roger Shuy begins the concluding chapter (‘On 
Testifying’) of his influential book Language Crimes: the Use and Abuse of Language 
Evidence in the Courtroom (1993). Shuy goes on to outline both some of the possibilities and 
some of the limits surrounding the contribution a linguist can make in the courtroom. He 
describes the special value of primary data, such as audio tapes, as opposed to merely 
secondary data such as transcripts or insights into states of mind; he recalls the pressure under 
which experts are cross-examined; and he describes widespread misunderstanding of the 
linguist’s role. Throughout Shuy’s comments, a consistent emphasis is felt: linguistics is 
Science. An expert linguistic analysis is expert to the extent that it is objective and impartial; 




What is as striking in the passage quoted (and in Shuy’s book as a whole) as the author’s 
consistently vivid evocation of forensic linguistics is how readily he isolates linguistic 
enquiry from further engagement with the discourse environment within which his testifying 
takes place. In many intellectual contexts, such a separation of disciplinary content from 
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social contexts of disciplinary application would be unremarkable. But the view Shuy 
presents is in evident but unstated contrast to other influential paradigms of discourse 
investigation within linguistic and cultural study. In these contrasting approaches, rather than 
being an inert backdrop which hardly merits comment, the surrounding ‘discourse regime’, or 
frameworks of language use in a given institutional setting, are thought equally to consist of 
complex discourse events which transact social relations, and to be as a result almost as 
essential to an analysis as the ‘object’ discourse itself. Critical linguistics, for instance 
(stretching from stylistic work in the tradition of Roger Fowler or Gunter Kress (cf. Fowler, 
Kress, and Trew, 1979) through to approaches to discourse more directly influenced by 
Althusser, Said, or Foucault) typically claims an intricate web of interrelations between the 
discourse being analysed and a texture of other, surrounding discourses (in some formulations 
called an ‘interdiscourse’ (Pecheux, 1982)). For such ‘critical’ approaches, engagement often 
leads to an unpicking or deconstruction of the larger fabric of social discourse and an 
oppositional, rather than instrumentally ‘expert opinion’ role. More importantly as regards 
Shuy’s testimony, when discourses are understood as being relational or relative to one 
another in this way, everywhere part of a continuous social construction of reality, then the 
analytic discourse itself also becomes part of the field of investigation, rather than outside it. 
No neutral position from which to judge a given ‘object’ discourse simply objectively is 
considered possible.  
 
This chapter is about the distance between two lines of approach to applying linguistics in 
legal contexts which follow from this contrast, approaches which share a number of topics 
and techniques while differing fundamentally in terms of philosophy and relation to their 
object of enquiry. I confine myself to three specific concerns. First, I describe the two 
approaches: the emergent field of forensic linguistics itself and critical analyses usually 
known as Critical Discourse Analysis and Critical Legal Studies. Second, I offer a slightly 
more detailed account  of  ‘meaning’ issues in particular, suggesting that how questions of 
meaning are handled in legal disputes can expose questionable assumptions in our beliefs 
about linguistic expertise. I conclude with brief comment on why, in a period of rapidly 
changing communications technologies and industries (as well as changing demands being 
placed on academic expertise), our notions of professional authority with respect to language 
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and meaning may need further consideration. The instance of language and law may serve in 
this way, I hope, to illuminate potential difficulties with the concept of ‘application’ in what 
we now call ‘applied linguistics’ (on the assumption than an earlier, presumed synonymy 
between Applied Linguistics and ELT no longer holds). 
 
2. Forensic linguistics 
 
Over the last ten or fifteen years, forensic linguistics has emerged as a small, but nevertheless 
relatively distinct new field. (Fore-runners have been variously identified in evidence given 
by William Labov and John Gumperz in the United States in the 1960s and 1970s, and, in 
Britain, in Jan Svartvik’s critique of the statement dictated by Timothy Evans to police and 
presented at his trial for the alleged murder of his wife (see Coulthard, 1994:27).) Whatever 
uncertainties surround definition of the new field, forensic linguistics is evidently in a period 
of institutional consolidation. It has, for instance, an international (though still quite small) 
mailbase, and an international professional association (IAFL), as well as (since 1994) a 
specialist journal edited by Peter French and Malcolm Coulthard at Birmingham, England: 
Forensic Linguistics: the International Journal of Speech, Language and the Law (for a 
useful selection of forensic-linguistic writings, see also Gibbons, 1995).  
 
In many jurisdictions, in both criminal and civil cases, expert linguistic opinion is now 
offered on a regular basis. It is also occasionally presented within complaints procedures to 
regulatory bodies, such as, in Britain, the Independent Television Commission (ITC), the 
Press Complaints Commission (PCC), or the Advertising Standards Authority (ASA). No 
authoritative figures are available as regards how many linguists or cases are involved, though 
the provenance of many of most prominent forensic linguists reflects how far linguistic 
evidence is constrained by differences between legal systems. Most well-known exponents, 
such as Judith Levi, Bethany Dumas, Diana Eades, Georgia Green, or Ellen Prince, work in 
the United States, where Federal Rules of Evidence make the legal system hospitable to 
expert evidence which is  ‘reputable science, comprehensible to a jury, and useful’ (Shuy, 
1993). Rather smaller numbers of linguists practise forensically in Australia and in  Britain, 
where the work of Malcolm Coulthard and Peter French has gained particular authority and 
prominence. 
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2.1 Two definitions 
 
What exactly, though, is meant by ‘forensic linguistics’, the name to which Shuy seems so 
indifferent? Two main, provisional definitions currently circulate (and were recently debated, 
informally, on the forensic linguistics mailbase).  
 
One definition is relatively narrow and specific. It characterises forensic linguistics roughly as 
follows: ‘the use of linguistic techniques to investigate crimes in which language data form 
part of the evidence’. The focus of this definition is on language as a contested object of legal 
examination. Under this definition there are two main kinds of evidence: identification 
evidence (who said or wrote what?) and interpretive evidence (what does a given utterance 
mean?). Investigative techniques suited to both kinds of question can be applied to various 
sorts of data, from written documents through to the analysis of cockpit voice recorders. In 
between, common materials for analysis include legal instruments such as wills, affidavits, 
and contracts, as well as quasi-legal documents which have specific implications in the legal 
field of tort. Linguistic identification evidence can also be used to supplement more 
recognised, instrumental techniques for investigating document authorship, such as ESDA 
(ESDA = Electro-Static Detection Apparatus, invented 1978), a form of testing widely used 
in the analysis of contested contemporaneous notes of police interviews (see Davis, 1994). 
 
The second definition of forensic linguistics is broader. It draws in a wide range of procedural 
aspects of law besides specifically linguistic evidence. Under this definition forensic 
linguistics is something like ‘the application of linguistic principles to the practice of law’. 
Included under this rubric are most aspects of language in a legal setting, including (as well as 
the kinds of courtroom evidence listed above) statute drafting and interpretation; court 
reporting; cross-cultural communication and failed communication in the courtroom; and  the 
examination of law as a rhetorical practice. In this understanding, forensic linguistics might 
claim a role not only as expert evidence but also in activities as various as the training of 
lawyers and other courtroom personnel, courtroom interpreting, and the monitoring of legal 
procedures, including for example how well legal terms are understood by defendants, juries 
and witnesses (who inevitably bring ‘ordinary language’ assumptions to the technical 
discourse of legal professionals). 
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2.2 Four fields of linguistic expertise 
 
Each of the two definitions above is formulated in terms of a given scope for the application 
of linguistics within the established field of legal practice. In this respect, both definitions can 
be thought of as functionally-conceived: they delineate a domain of application (within law) 
rather than a domain of expertise being drawn on (in linguistics). 
 
It is more common, of course, for linguists themselves to sub-divide their professional 
activity in terms of linguistic specialism, categorising in effect what each ‘expert’ would 
bring to the table rather than what the value or use of that expertise might be in the legal 
context into which it is exported. If we follow this more familiar classification, we are likely 
to distinguish four main areas of expertise, roughly as Judith Levi did in her helpful overview 
in the first issue of Forensic Linguistics (Levi, 1994).  
 
2.2.1 Phonetics:  
 
Forensic phoneticians are concerned with sound, usually in recorded form. They may be 
called on to help with voice or speaker identification, for instance in cases involving 
telephone threats or telephoned claims of responsibility. In other cases, what may be in 
question is the accuracy or validity of a conversational transcript, or of inaudible material on a 
disputed tape. Investigative techniques include use of spectrograms and other instrumental 
approaches, alongside the phonetician’s expert intuitions (methods and problems in forensic 
phonetics have been extensively written-up in Forensic Linguistics).  
 
Perhaps the most frequently called-on group of linguists, phoneticians have organised 
themselves into a separate association, the IAFP (International Association of Forensic 
Phonetics). Mostly, their evidence is ‘identification’ evidence in the sense indicated above: it 
offers a kind of speaker profiling, sometimes rather recklessly called an ‘acoustic fingerprint’. 
More often than not, such evidence is presented by the defence in criminal actions in an effort 
to eliminate a particular suspect from an enquiry on the basis of accent, rather than by the 
prosecution: evidence claiming to exclude someone from a given group membership on the 
basis of a missing or different cluster of phonetic features is considered more likely to be 
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compelling than the same evidence presented in order to make a unique, ‘positive 
identification’ (Levi, 1994:31). 
 
2.1.2 Syntax and style markers:  
 
Evidence of this kind, especially to do with written documents, is also generally concerned 
with author identification, sometimes on the basis of a relatively small sample of contested 
writing such as a witness statement, a letter, or a suicide note.  
 
Drawing on intuitions about style, as well as on data from large corpora (for relative 
frequency of words and their patterns of co-occurrence or collocation), stylistic evidence is 
concerned to show the relative likelihood of a sample of written text being written by one or 
another alleged author (for an overview of corpus approaches, see for example Aijmer and 
Altenberg, 1991; for forensic applications, see Coulthard, 1994). In the case of possible 
speakers from different institutional settings - such as a criminal suspect and a police officer, 
in the case of disputed statement evidence - use can be made of register-specific and user-
specific sub-corpora, which indicate specific likelihoods and examples of contested patterns 
found in the document among language users of the respective professional or social groups. 
 
There is an overlap here, of course, between forensic style-analysis and other applications of 
the same expertise. In the United States, for instance, the linguist Donald Foster (who has 
recently acted for the FBI in a number of prominent murder trials) started by searching for 
stylistic patterns within Shakespearean authorship studies (and has attributed an additional 
poem to Shakespeare); more recently he identified journalist Joe Klein as the author of the 
anonymously published Primary Colors, before shifting emphasis onto forensic projects.  
 
An interesting example of stylistic opinion can be seen in evidence given by British linguist 
Malcolm Coulthard in the case of Derek Bentley, a nineteen-year-old hanged in the early 
1950s but later given a Royal Pardon (and whose conviction has been overturned in the Court 
of Appeal this year (1998)). Bentley was illiterate and had an exceptionally low IQ; he 
accompanied a friend, Chris Craig, on a burglary during which Craig fatally shot a policeman. 
Although Bentley was already in police custody at the time of the shooting, he was executed 
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for his role in the murder (Craig himself was under-age for the death penalty). Coulthard’s 
evidence during the appeal against the earlier verdict - two decades after Bentley’s execution 
- included an analysis of Bentley’s supposed statement to police, in which the relative 
frequency of occurrence of certain stylistic patterns (including use of the construction 
‘Subject [+ Verb] + “then”’ supports the defence view that Bentley’s statement was at least in 
key sections likely to have been authored by police interrogators rather than by Bentley 
himself (Coulthard, 1994: 31-3 & 41-2). 
 
2.2.3 Discourse structure and conversational analysis  
 
The most well-known figure in this field is Roger Shuy himself. Shuy’s work has for many 
years been especially concerned with audio-tape evidence, including evidence from secret 
recordings, and with the accuracy of transcripts produced by one side or the other in a legal 
action. While concerned with recorded audio evidence, and so in this respect resembling a 
forensic phonetician, Shuy’s analysis of taped conversations focuses not on vocal features in 
order to identify the speaker (or a regional or social group to which the speaker belongs), but 
on what constitutes different speech acts and their uptake within the structured continuum of 
a discourse event. He examines conversational features such as back-channel behaviour, topic 
initiation, topic re-cycling, response and interruption strategies, intonation markers, pause 
lengths and local strategies of ambiguity resolution in order to ascertain what is going on not 
only at the surface level of discourse (exactly what speech event is taking place?) but also in 
terms of what is going on at the level of intention and motivation. 
 
In his book Language Crimes, Shuy reports evidence he has contributed to a large number of 
cases involving disputed promises, threats, and admissions, as well as cases of alleged perjury 
and bribery. Bribery, in fact, which Shuy describes as ‘one of the more common “white-
collar” crimes’ (Shuy, 1993:20), provides a clear instance of a complex but analysable 
discourse event: the structure of a ‘completed and felicitous’ bribe can be described, and a 
bribery event accordingly analysed into a series of necessary, component phases: problem, 
proposal, completion, and extension. Each phase, according to Shuy, has typical tasks and 
roles for the bribe offerer and for the bribe receiver, as well as typical talk realising the 
relevant phase. By analysing the speech-event structure of bribery, a bribe can be 
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distinguished from other, cognate (but in legal terms non-equivalent) speech events, such as 
an offer: ‘The difference’, Shuy suggests, ‘between an offer and a bribe is simply this: in the 
quid pro quo of a bribe, one of the elements is illegal’ (Shuy, 1993:43). With careful 
assistance or coaching, Shuy argues, a jury can be encouraged to hear in tape evidence 
presented to it conversational structures which they might otherwise not be aware of, 
especially out of context. Ignorance of such structures on the other hand might lead members 
of the jury, the reasoning goes - particularly with encouragement from opposing counsel - to 
interpret the discourse in a different way. 
 
2.2.4 Meaning (semantics and pragmatics) 
 
Meaning evidence, based either on semantic or pragmatic expertise, tends to be far less 
common than phonetic or stylistic opinion even in jurisdictions where considerable use is 
made of linguistic opinion, as Judith Levi has observed in her round-up of forensic linguistic 
practice (Levi, 1994:10), though Levi does acknowledge that she has taken no account in her 
estimate of civil actions or of complaints to non-statutory, regulatory bodies. Opinions as to 
meaning may be more common as background, case preparation than as courtroom evidence, 
for reasons of admissibility discussed below. 
 
Where it is occurs, meaning evidence is (inevitably) interpretive rather than identificatory. 
Such evidence is concerned either with the range of plausible meanings a given word or 
expression is capable of bearing, or else with the meaning most likely to have been ascribed 
to a given, contested utterance in a precisely specified context: what, for example, must 
statement X have meant to readers of document Y on day Z? 
 
Evidence as to meaning can be brought to bear in a number of different legal fields, ranging 
from nationality law (is someone who holds an ‘entry visa’ justified in feeling they have a 
right to enter a country? (cf Coulthard, 1994:37) through to explicating or disambiguating  
terms in insurance policy disputes and contracts (how is an ‘upgrade’ to be differentiated 
from routine maintenance and replacement?). Evidence may serve to elucidate technical 
terms, slang, and sub-cultural idioms; and it can be used in challenges to the capability of 
complained-of expressions to bear a pleaded meaning in defamation actions (are the 
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expressions ‘scam’ or ‘economical with the truth’, for example, likely to be defamatory in 
their ordinary signification? (Durant, 1996)). Meaning evidence can form a basis for 
argument as to the adequacy or otherwise of warnings printed on cigarette packets, or as to 
the likely effect of allegedly prejudicial, pre-trial coverage of imminent court cases. More 
generally, meaning evidence can mediate the gap between legal ‘terms of art’ (‘abuse’, 
‘malice’, ‘recklessness’, and so on) and their ‘ordinary language’ counterparts, or simply offer 
an evaluation of ways of construing ‘ordinary language’ terms used in difficult contexts 
(‘dangerous’ or ‘safe’, when used of, say, a medical appliance or food, or the contextually-
sensitive meaning of ‘enough’ or ‘favourite’).  Perhaps most famously at present, meaning-
evidence might be presented glossing ‘sexual relations’ as part of the enquiry into whether 
President Clinton’s ‘I never had sexual relations with that woman’, constitutes perjury, given 
a reasonable understanding of the question the President was being asked. 
 
Further potential for interpretive evidence along these lines is suggested by another aspect, 
not fully explored at the time, of the Derek Bentley case referred to above. Immediately 
before the shooting, Bentley allegedly called to Craig ‘Let him have it, Chris’ (though Bentley 
himself denied that the words were ever uttered and claimed that they had been invented by 
the police). It is a celebrated controversy of meaning-based debate whether ‘let him have it’ in 
these circumstances meant ‘shoot him’ or ‘hand over the gun’ - a divergence of meaning with 
quite fundamental consequences as regards Bentley’s presumed role in the killing. 
 
3. Critical approaches to discourse and law 
 
The sketch I have offered of forensic linguistics so far is, in each of its constituent 
descriptions, greatly over-simplified. To avoid any doubt, I should perhaps add that I do not 
believe these snap-shots adequately describe the work of particular approaches or individual 
scholars. What they do offer, I hope, is a suggestive contrast with two other influential 
approaches which we should now consider: Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), and Critical 
Legal Studies (CLS). Here again, there isn’t enough space to review either field adequately; I 
can only highlight main directions and issues relevant to the comparison with forensic 
linguistics. 
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3.1   Critical discourse analysis 
 
Whereas forensic linguistic work starts from the premise that linguistic expertise can help the 
existing legal system to work better, Critical Discourse Analysis directs its expertise towards 
revealing shortcomings or political agendas in how discourses and institutions function, 
especially in terms of misrepresentation, inaccessibility, or bias.  
 
Critical Discourse Analysis adopts this goal for discourse investigation on the basis of a 
cluster of general insights about language, including at least the following. Language plays an 
important role in social reproduction, but is at the same time contested within the overall 
social order. Because of its unsettled but influential position, language can be usefully 
investigated in terms of its relations to power and ideology. In discourse, power exceeds the 
exercise of force or rule of law, and is expressed in asymmetries between participants in 
discourse events, as well as people’s unequal capacity to control how texts are produced, 
distributed, and consumed. Although underpinned at the level of the political economy of 
communications, much of the power invested in and circulating through discourse functions 
almost invisibly, by consent. 
 
While Critical Discourse Analysis is perhaps best known in the form of the work of British 
linguist Norman Fairclough (Fairclough, 1989, 1995), a range of other, major alternative 
frameworks also exist, often developed in complex, hybrid forms. Some of these approaches 
are far less grounded than Fairclough’s in concepts (adapted from Gramsci and Althusser) of 
the state, ideology, and systems of social control. Eminent among such alternatives is the 
approach, derived ultimately from Habermas, which invokes an ideal of rational 
communication and critiques ‘disorders of discourse’ which fall short of that ideal (cf. 
Wodak, 1996). Perhaps most widely influential at present are approaches drawing on 
Foucault, concerned with the uneven social dispersal of power through (especially technical) 
discourses at all social levels, constituting subjectivity as well as social relations (for 
discussion, see Mills, 1997).  
 
Across its variant forms, Critical Discourse Analysis has in common an engagement with the 
social operation of language by seeking to show how language is not, as it seems, an invisible 
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window on the world, but a material practice with a performative capability within the overall 
formation and reproduction of social institutions through which power, including symbolic 
power, is unevenly distributed - and also struggled for - across a given society. In particular, 
language is argued to encode point-of-view, and with it culturally-acquired contextual 
assumptions which are embedded in the texture of discourse at a level where they are no 
longer evident. Such assumptions are routinely retrieved by interpreters, however, when 
triggered as presuppositions or as different sorts of implicature (often as bridging inferences 
which have to be made by listeners or readers for the sake of the coherence of a piece of 
discourse, but which in doing so carry specific, ideological assumptions along with them).  
Because of the differing amounts of symbolic capital different styles or registers of discourse 
enjoy within the linguistic field, too (Bourdieu, 1991:37-65), even selection of a register or 
genre can enact power differentials, reflecting the unequal social access of speakers to 
different parts of an overall, socially available discourse repertoire. While mainstream 
sociolinguistics investigates variation in the forms and styles of language use, for Critical 
Discourse Analysis such insights must be linked closely to an analysis of a given political 
order if they are to be properly understood or challenged.  
 
3.2 Critical legal studies 
 
In one sense, Critical Legal Studies complements within legal studies the oppositional project 
of Critical Discourse Analysis in linguistics and cultural studies. Similarly influenced by the 
ideology debates of the 1970s and 1980s, by the discourse theory of writers such as Foucault 
and Pecheux, by modern revivals of rhetorical studies, and by hermeneutic debates 
surrounding the writings of Gadamer and others, Critical Legal Studies examines how law 
acquires its authority and power on the basis of what are viewed as misunderstandings of the 
functioning of language and discourse.  
 
One way into understanding the concerns of Critical Legal Studies is to consider the phrase, 
‘rule of law’. ‘Rule’ simultaneously refers both to a code (or constructed, conventional 
system) of law, and also to law’s regulatory effect or power. The power element of law (its 
ability to imprison, confiscate, and in many jurisdictions kill) is largely in this context self-
explanatory; but ‘rule’ in the sense of ‘code’ requires comment. For Critical Legal Studies, 
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power creates law as system apparently independent of itself, codified and separated from 
history and circumstances; in this sense law is a formalism required as displacement from the 
cruder, social realities in which power is exercised, what Stanley Fish has called in a different 
context, somewhat dismissively, a kind of ‘moral algebra’ (Fish, 1994:ix).  
 
In dominant perceptions of law, legal values and formulations are believed to be somehow 
transcendent of history and social interest. In his influential book, Legal Discourse: Studies in 
Linguistics, Rhetoric and Legal Analysis (1987), as in his earlier and more comprehensive 
Reading the Law (1986), Peter Goodrich describes such discourse as ‘a discrete and unitary 
genre of written authorities constituting a grammar or code, which, if correctly attributed and 
interpreted, forms a series of necessary truths’ (Goodrich, 1987:205). This characterisation is 
presented by way of contrast with Goodrich’s own critique that,  
 
What has been consistently excluded from the ambit of legal studies has been the 
possibility of analysing law as a specific stratification or ‘register’ of an actually 
existent language system, together with the correlative denial of the heuristic value of 
analysing legal texts themselves as historical products organised according to 
rhetorical criteria. (Goodrich, 1987:1) 
 
Arguing that law achieves authority only on the basis of its abstraction from social 
circumstances or specific history, Critical Legal Studies seeks to unpick legal rhetoric. It 
investigates especially how, once produced, apparently fixed and timeless rules mesh with 
and adapt to new and changing social circumstances in which they are applied. Close reading 
of particular applications of law to circumstances reveals absences and inconsistencies 
between the principles being promulgated in legal discourse and the ‘specific political and 
ideological motives and affiliations’ (Goodrich, 1987:5) which function as driving forces 
behind its application. As Goodrich puts it, 
 
In reading the law, it is constantly necessary to remember the compositional, stylistic 
and semantic mechanisms which allow legal discourse to deny its historical and social 
genesis. It is necessary to examine the silences, absences and empirical potential of 
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the legal text, and to dwell upon the means by which it appropriates the meaning of 
other discourses and of social relations themselves, while specifically denying that it 
is doing so. (Goodrich, 1987: 204)  
 
Critical Legal Studies suggests that, when implemented or interpreted, legal formalism (the 
whole edifice of a conventionally-formulated legal code) fails to produce consistent results, 
so defeating its claims to provide a non-circumstantial, equitable formula for justice. Rather, 
according to Critical Legal Studies, its decisions turn out to be not so much based on 
transcendent values as on specific, local considerations and contingencies. 
 
An insightful commentary on Critical Legal Studies (also illustrated with reference to 
Goodrich’s writings) can be found in more recent essays by Stanley Fish, such as those in 
There’s No Such Thing As Free Speech... And It’s A Good Thing Too (1994).  Fish agrees 
with much in the critique of legal discourse provided by Critical Legal Studies, such as the 
view that law continuously constructs the principles it is thought to rest on, and, instead of 
building a set of ‘perspicuous and immutable abstractions’ as it claims to do, simply rests on 
a ‘self-occluding and perhaps self-deceiving form’ (Fish, 1994:179). But Fish goes on to 
argue that he nevertheless arrives at very different conclusions from those common in Critical 
Legal Studies, which he characterises as the view that ‘the law is a sham or an elitist 
conspiracy’ (Fish, 1994:2).  
 
Instead, Fish suggests that doing law and analysing law are essentially different enterprises: 
‘doing’ law is a practical process of making decisions and exercising power (cf. Fish, 
1994:177), in which legal discourse serves as what might be called a screen (in several senses 
of the word) usefully placed between the contingency of everyday life and the equally 
contingent character of law’s own historically-produced structures. Fish transforms the 
common-place perception that ‘the law is social, not propositional’ into an argument oblique 
to the core insights of Critical Legal Studies. He claims that legal language functions as 
persuasion, without secure philosophical foundation, precisely in order to assist social 
arbitration and compromises in ever-changing social circumstances. In doing so, law is for 
Fish one among a number of institutions by means of which ‘we negotiate the differences that 
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would, if they were given full sway, prevent us from living together in what we are pleased to 
call civilization’ (Fish 1994:179). 
 
4. ‘Applying’ linguistics to law 
 
Forensic linguistics and different strands within critical cultural studies, then, each seek 
engagement between language and law, but in radically different ways. Whereas Forensic 
Linguistics presents itself as a sort of service industry, selling expertise to legal practice 
without commenting on the overall structure of the legal process itself, Critical Legal Studies 
(and less directly Critical Discourse Analysis) claims a sort of meta-commentary and 
polemical leverage, on both the procedures and theoretical foundations of the prevailing legal 
order. 
 
Bringing together the different dimensions of applying linguistics to law which have been 
outlined above (scope of application; field of existing linguistic expertise; purpose of the 
application), we can now say that, whether called ‘forensic’ or not, the linguist can engage 
with the field of law - rather than writing theoretically or imaginatively about it -  in any one 
of four principal modalities:  
 
1.  In an established jurisprudential view, legal language is not so much ordinary 
language selectively drawn on as a distinct formalism, marked off from ordinary 
language by careful procedures of definition and construction. Such definition and 
construction are performed by lawyers for their own professional purposes, and legal 
discourse is to be understood on lawyers’ terms even where a vocabulary is used 
which overlaps with common usage. Constrained or tamed in this way, language 
functions to specifically legal principles, supported by a reported history of 
judgements and precedents rather than by everyday conventions of idiom or usage. 
Occasionally lawyers may wish to call on linguists to advise them on metalingual 
issues, employing linguists as extras in legal-hermeneutic practice. The technical 
character of legal language, however, ensures that it remains securely a field in which 
lawyers, rather than linguists, have expertise and authority. Almost irrespective of 
expertise about ‘ordinary’ language, therefore, the linguist is excluded from authority 
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in this demarcated domain of usage (in a manner somewhat analogous to separations 
between natural language and other constructed, language-like codes such as 
computer languages or the language of logic).  
 
2.  In a virtually opposite account, law can be viewed as an institution made up of 
discourse, both in its rhetorical procedures of pleas and writs, injunctions and 
acquittals, as well as in its reliance on textual exegesis. Since to this extent legal 
procedures depend on rhetoric, law as a whole is susceptible to theoretical critique and 
to examination (including critical examination) of its rhetorical form and strategies. In 
this view, methods for analysing language offer a means of deconstructing legal 
discourse, exposing its apparently autonomous, technical language as a product of the 
social conditions, affiliations and purposes surrounding its construction. For linguists 
within this framework, engagement with law is in effect the inverse of the first type: a 
kind of oppositional, politicised legal hermeneutics. Such engagement takes place 
mostly educationally, outside legal practice, with linguistic authority setting itself up 
in opposition to legal authority. 
 
3.  Sometimes in criminal cases, the speaker of a recorded utterance or the author of a 
written document needs to be identified; sometimes a transcript needs to be judged for 
accuracy. Sometimes, in media law, a publication is alleged by a plaintiff to bear a 
particular, offensive meaning. In such circumstances, non-legal, social discourse 
(‘ordinary language’) comes before the courts. In cases of this kind, lawyers and 
judges decide the significance or meaning not of their own, technical legal language 
(as in legal hermeneutics) but of usage as they imagine it functions in the world 
beyond the courts. Engagement for linguists within this framework involves adding 
‘expert opinion’ to a judge’s view or jury’s intuitions. In this view the linguist 
supplements legal authority. 
 
4.  Finally, in any discussion which is directly about discourse, a vocabulary has to be 
found, as a sort of metalanguage (or language-about-language, to delineate concepts 
which deal specifically with the operation of discourse). Some of this vocabulary will 
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be specific to linguistics (‘is this segment velarised?’); other parts of the vocabulary 
may overlap with terms in common circulation (‘who is the audience for this text?’, 
‘How do irony, innuendo or pastiche work?’, ‘How far are interpretations affected by 
genre expectations?’ etc). Where metalingual terms in technical use by linguists 
overlap with everyday metalanguage, they may sometimes be co-opted into legal 
debate; but in this context the linguist is considered superfluous or irrelevant to legal 
process.  
 
It is implications of this final, fourth category which I consider in more detail below. Before 
doing that, however, I should acknowledge that there is an obvious difficulty with my four-
way classification: the amount (and implications) of overlap between categories. An 
expression of expert opinion about a contested discourse, for instance (my ‘type three’) 
inevitably involves elements of ‘type four’ (metalanguage, including more general 
assumptions about how features of language are best described). Moreover, if the way a 
linguist believes irony or pastiche or genre affects interpretation (a ‘type four’ insight) cannot 
be reconciled with the lawyer’s own, inherently ‘type one’ view (that is, if ‘type four’ 
investigations find themselves at odds with ‘type one’ hermeneutics), then the linguist’s 
professional duty appears to require less an expert, service role than a critical or oppositional 
stance (‘type two’).  
 
Interaction and overlap between my four categories of this kind is important because it warns 
of a possible crisis of identity for forensic linguistics as an emergent field, if mismatches 
between the categories turn out to be widespread and inevitable rather than merely local and 
contingent. How far should the linguist simply unpack her or his specialist tool-kit on 
demand, leaving broader issues of legal context and procedure to the different professional 
expertise of lawyers (as is implicit in the opening quotation from Language Crimes)? Or how 
far should linguists endeavour to contribute their own, sometimes different (on some issues, 
critical or polemical) insights regarding the social circulation of language and meaning, even 
if that means renegotiating underlying terms of dialogue and engagement between respective 
fields?  
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5. Contesting meaning  
 
The previous section ends by suggesting, in effect, that there may exist aspects of language 
use which, although essential to legal discussion, are not reducible to current paradigms of 
forensic-linguistic evidence. In this section, I explore this possibility further, by considering 
meaning in civil actions (mainly in media law). I suggest that legal deliberations over 
meaning can present problems to our prevailing notions of linguistic expertise and authority. 
First, however, we need to establish how legal disputes arise over the meaning of ‘ordinary 
discourse’, that is, about utterances from outside the legal sphere whose meaning comes to be 
contested at law.  
 
In a public sphere in which representations are produced and circulate in such forms as books, 
films, and radio and television programmes - as well as, increasingly, along the information 
super-highways - there is always potential for misrepresentation, misunderstanding and 
offence. Particular occasions on which interpretations of a discourse in the public domain are 
contested I like to characterise as ‘meaning trouble-spots’. Disputes at such trouble-spots - 
where a sort of interpretive gridlock occurs, with apparently no movement or flexibility 
possible in any direction - typically involve competing, alternative interpretations of some 
disputed word, phrase or passage. Interpretive disagreement in such contexts is not about the 
‘meaning of meaning’, in an abstract sense, but gives verbal form to other kinds of social 
difference and conflict. Significantly, there is rarely, if ever, a shortage of perceived meaning. 
Rather, what is usually contested is a crux, or point at which alternative meanings are 
presented, and between which arbitration is needed. Everyone believes their own 
interpretation is clear, even when locked in heated controversy with others who take a 
fundamentally different view.  
 
But if everyone is convinced they understand exactly what utterances mean, why should a 
linguist ever become involved? Perhaps such disputes are not about ‘meaning’, precisely, but 
rather about the underlying, extra-linguistic circumstances, such as events, histories and 
attitudes? In any case, meaning is in an important sense whatever people with native-speaker 
competence take utterances to say; if discrepancies arise, these may be the result of ongoing 
meaning change, or of inadequacies in reporting nuance and effect in semantics and 
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lexicography. On what authority can someone’s sense of the meaning of an utterance in their 
own language be queried or discredited? 
 
The very fact of disagreement or dispute over interpretations suggests that meaning in its 
broad, social senses is not something about which people share uniform intuitions, in the way 
that (to some extent) they can be said to about grammaticality or contradiction. Meaning is 
multi-dimensional; it involves and intersects with a range of cognitive effects, from referring 
and sense-relations through to connotation, memory and general beliefs. For virtually any 
utterance considered in the context of a given social interaction, there is therefore likely to be 
some degree of interpretive variation or divergence, either because of local linguistic 
obstacles (e.g. with slang or technical terms, or on account of ambiguity and processing 
difficulty), or simply because multiple, variant meanings are prompted by combining 
linguistic utterances with background knowledge or beliefs held by some, but not all, 
members of any given audience group (what a lawyer, in a manner which makes the condition 
seem marginal and pathological, might refer to as ‘innuendo meanings’). 
 
So far so good. But at this point, debate over the interpretation of contested utterances in legal 
cases needs to go off in two different (though ultimately related) directions. The first concerns 
the underlying model of meaning on which the law relies for its tests and adjudication. The 
second concerns how, in practice, authority is conferred on particular, pleaded interpretations. 
Each of these questions is considered separately.  
 
5.1 Meaning models  
 
Where does responsibility for meaning lie (and so also accountability for the social effects of 
producing or representing meanings in discourse)? It is difficult to see how regulation of 
discourse can proceed without some answer to this question. But finding an answer is 
anything but straightforward.  
 
If you believe, for instance, that ascribed effect is the proper test of meaning (as someone 
committed to audience ethnography, reception theory, or ethnomethodology might), then in a 
civil legal action the plaintiff should always succeed. Whenever an effect is reported (such as 
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feeling offended, aggrieved, outraged, or misrepresented), it has been precipitated by a 
reading which has, for whatever reason (leaving aside occasional cases of deliberate 
misrepresentation) been actually experienced. Effects prove themselves simply by being 
experienced and reported; and it makes little sense to say that a Muslim who claims to have 
been offended on reading The Satanic Verses has in fact not been offended, only (for the sake 
of argument here) that they had no good grounds to be, perhaps because being offended may 
be an effect of the novel but not part of its meaning. On the other hand, if you believe that 
speaker-intention or authorial intention provides the best authority for meaning, then the 
defendant in an action should always succeed (at least whenever rebuttal is on grounds that 
the effect was not what was intended (or in that sense ‘meant’), even if the construction to be 
put on the words in order to produce such a reading sounds rather like Humpty Dumpty’s 
approach to meaning in Alice Through the Looking Glass). You may reject both of these 
possibilities, insisting instead that it is the form of the utterance itself which prescribes how 
the utterance is to be interpreted. But it is then difficult to see why anyone should mis-
interpret at all, except in marginal respects where specific features of the form are 
misunderstood. It is also difficult to see why there should be interpretive disputes, as opposed 
to disputes exclusively about the contents of discourse, in the first place. 
 
These idiosyncratic consequences of trying to allocate responsibility for meaning to specified 
agents or agencies within a communicative event are produced to some extent by simplistic 
presentation of each model. That presentation could be refined, of course; and richer, 
‘combination’ models can be identified2. But the odd implications of the different models of 
meaning are also a result of something else: a mismatch between conceiving enquiry into 
meaning as a search for a singular, interpretive truth, and conceiving enquiry into meaning, 
within  an adversarial system of justice, as a struggle over discrepant understandings in which 
plaintiffs accentuate as far as possible whichever interpretation is most consistent with their 
statement of claim, while defendants stretch the meaning they represent as far as possible in 
another (or the other) direction in order precisely to undermine that claim.  
 
Faced with this difficulty, legal formulations have responded to the obvious need for tests of 
meaning to be separated from the viewpoints of the immediate protagonists, while remaining 
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anchored as closely as possible in the circumstances of the particular communication event 
(for a comprehensive account, see Robertson and Nichol, 1992). The meaning-question asked 
instead is accordingly: how far is a pleaded interpretation reasonable or warranted? And 
should the utterance be deemed the cause of the claimed, injurious effect? Put another way, 
law is concerned with how ‘legitimate’ an interpretation is, where the political concept of 
‘legitimacy’, carried over into communication, relies on a notion of public recognition - with 
public recognition, in turn (to gloss the ‘man on the Clapham omnibus’) based on something 
like the scale or likelihood of interpretive uptake coupled with some commonly-held standard 
of reason used in deriving the interpretation. 
 
At present, accordingly, each public arena in which meaning is contested has its own standard 
for the legitimacy of an interpretation, varying slightly according to that field’s own 
institutional history and founding assumptions. In defamation, there is the test of the ‘ordinary 
and natural signification’ of an expression, and with it ‘the ordinary reader’ and ‘right-
thinking persons’. In obscenity law, there is ‘outrage to public decency’ and the controversial 
‘tendency to deprave and corrupt’. In advertising, the doctrine exists of ‘truthful, honest, 
decent, fair’, with related tests in trade descriptions. In copyright law there is the test of 
‘derogatory’ treatment as regards moral rights. Such tests, with their recurrent vocabulary of 
‘unjust and unfair’, ‘likely to incite...’, ‘likely to cause grave or widespread offence’, function 
within the larger framework of legal concepts, mirroring in their own handling of intention, 
for instance, a more general standard of intentionality: that what you intend is whatever the  
natural and probable consequences of your action happen to be.  
 
At this point, however, we must pick up a distinction passed over without comment above 
(introduced in relation to offence being given by reading The Satanic Verses): the distinction 
between ‘meaning’ and ‘effect’. Legal tests typically speak more of what we think of as social 
effects, rather than ‘meanings’ (in, say, the sense of mental representations or affective 
states). Legally words, in fact, convey meaning only to the extent that they serve as 
instruments of definable actions, such as imputing misconduct, inciting specified behaviour, 
or causing offence, loss of esteem, or pecuniary loss.  Where effects, rather than meanings, 
are ruled on, meanings can only be in question to the extent that they form part of a causal 
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chain between discourse and effect.  
 
Although the detail of such a causal chain is rarely spelled out, linkage along these lines is 
commonly assumed, though it is best seen in reverse, from perceived effect back to claimed 
discourse origin. The social control or regulation which laws are designed to achieve is 
premised on a belief that certain classes of effect associated with a discourse (primarily 
encouragement towards specified forms of behaviour) should be curtailed. The alleged 
capability of a disputed text to produce or cause those effects follows in turn from a 
perception of the contested discourse coupled with a judgement that such a perception is 
warranted by the text (that is, a reasonable interpretation rather than an act of whimsy on the 
part of an audience). What would usually be called a text’s meaning is as such a 
representation of the discourse linked in two directions: in one direction, linked back to the 
text, both by linguistic convention (of words and grammatical structures) and by derivation 
(inferential procedures which combine linguistic representations with background 
knowledge); in the other direction, linked to effect, on the basis of further suppositions about 
how mental representations prompt or justify social behaviour. So while it may appear to be 
effects rather than meanings which are being regulated, in order to hold discourses 
accountable for effects which allegedly follow from them an intermediate, distinct (and so 
disputable) category of meanings is difficult to avoid: interpretation rather than use of the 
contested discourse, to borrow a distinction well-made in Eco’s essay, ‘Intentio lectoris: the 
state of the art’ (Eco, 1994:44-63). 
 
5.2 Representing meanings in debate 
 
It might be said that issues about how meanings are produced by discourse and in turn 
produce effects are academic, in all the negative senses of that word. Barristers and others 
presenting legal cases, it might be thought, deal already with the relevant complexities of 
language and meaning, only in a more user-friendly and elegant discourse.  
 
This is partly true, and should not be understated. But while legal advocacy presents an 
undoubtedly rich and sophisticated view of utterance interpretation, it does so more by 
effective persuasion than by analysis. Arguably claims and counter-claims are made about 
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contested utterances in legal debate on the basis of sometimes quite casual engagement with 
the specific practice or mechanisms of interpretation. Where questions arise, for instance, 
about figurative language (including irony), about how particular speech acts are recognised, 
about what you could expect from a meaning-preserving paraphrase, or about expectations 
specific to a given idiom or genre, they are mostly dealt with by means of straightforward, 
broad-brush appeals to a jury’s intuitions and empathy, either with the speaker or with an 
aggrieved reader (depending on which side of the argument counsel is on). Lawyers defend 
this approach by saying that to depart from appeals to common sense and emotion in their 
dealings with juries on these issues misses the point of trial by jury, and is in any case 
counter-productive.   
 
In English law, discussions as to meaning dispense with interpretive complications as far as 
possible. They replace such difficulties with the reassuring sense of a judge and jury readily 
knowing how discourse works and what any given discourse means. In these circumstances, 
little room remains for the linguist. The judge’s authority combines with the jury’s intuitions 
to constitute a legitimising image of the speech community. While intuitions of the 
protagonists themselves are discounted on the basis that they have a special interest in 
nudging interpretation towards a specific, self-serving meaning, the intuitions of a jury are 
sacrosanct. Only rarely (for instance in cases of slang or technical terms, or where specific 
local assumptions need to be filled in, to explicate an innuendo meaning in defamation) can 
such intuitions be directly challenged or corrected. Suitably informed, the jury is right, 
whatever judgement it arrives at about meaning (though it is worth noting that the judgement 
on meaning is in any case then rolled up in a verdict on an overall case, in which meaning 
issues play only a subsidiary part). 
 
Given the primacy of a jury’s intuitions about meaning, then, is there anything extra the 
linguist can offer? Certainly not a somehow better, more insightful, or more authoritative 
reading; in the circumstances, an exemplary reading is only ‘exemplary’ in the sense of being 
illustrative, never authoritative. Background information about the history and patterns of 
usage of expressions may be helpful; but the only authority a linguist might convincingly 
bring is that of a skilled presenter who is not only accustomed to articulating interpretations, 
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but also experienced in assisting others with the process of explicating, comparing and 
evaluating them (though for insightful discussion of complications surrounding the 
professional status of linguists, see Hutton, 1996). 
  
In practical terms, the linguist might give substance to this role in difficult cases by assisting a 
legal team in any one (or some combination) of four main ways:  
 
1)  By comparing a given usage with other uses of the same expression. This can be done 
easily and accessibly by using electronic concordance data; such a procedure allows 
parallel uses of a contested expression to be looked at in their relevant linguistic 
contexts (from which a great deal of additional information about sense-relations and 
about an expression’s attitudinal or affective properties can be inferred). Such 
evidence is easily caricatured, however, as ‘super-dictionary’ work, reflecting current 
legal reluctance, at least in Britain, to invoke dictionaries rather than jury intuitions as 
a basis for word or idiom meaning.  Appealing to dictionaries and concordances is 
believed to distract too far from the particular case in hand in the direction of ‘general 
capability to mean’ (away, that is, from the contested utterance in its given context 
towards merely the sentence or sentences which make up the linguistic form of the 
utterance). 
 
2)  By manipulating the disputed utterance or text in controlled ways, substituting into the 
utterance near-synonyms, cognate terms, opposites, or other patterned alternatives at 
key points, inviting gradually contrasting intuitions. If extended very far, this 
procedure is likely to take on the negative associations of pedantry and abstraction 
which may well characterise ‘semantics’ in the jury’s minds, as well as displacing 
discussion too far from the specific circumstances of the utterance (as above). 
 
3)  By presenting background information about the history, and regional and social 
distribution, of an expression or given meaning. Such information may be useful as 
regards slang, or sub-cultural, or technical vocabulary, or to help with allusions 
involved in alleged innuendo meanings in defamation. Evidence about the likely 
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social distribution of meanings or interpretations may be particularly relevant when 
linked with evidence - especially contradictory evidence - about probable readership 
or audience.  
 
4)  By presenting empirical evidence about interpreters other than the judge and jury 
themselves, in the form of survey and questionnaire data. Such data can be 
informative about trends in varying public intuitions as to degrees or scales within a 
series of abusive or potentially defamatory terms, or accepted or potential paraphrases 
for contested utterances. It can also report patterns of social knowledge which are 
highly relevant in dealing with cultural allusions, especially allusions to fast-moving 
popular culture. Such evidence is also easily caricatured, however, this time as 
‘opinion poll justice’, in which informants appear to vote for meanings which the 
court is then expected to endorse. The sting of this caricature is again that the 
authority of judge and jury (as representatives of the speech community in the court, 
as well as symbolic figures for the authority of the law) may be undermined by a 




One conclusion about forensic linguistics seems unavoidable: there is not one, but many 
different varieties of forensic linguistics, with very different institutional possibilities. The 
field can only appear coherent and unified in its search for increased public recognition if a 
number of fairly fundamental questions about applying linguistics to law are elided or 
ignored.  
 
Divergence between different strands is manifest not least in terms of admissibility of 
evidence. While there is undoubtedly forensic expertise in bloodstains and firearms, courts 
see themselves (and with arguments for doing so) as expert on language. Insofar as linguistic 
evidence is recognised at all, there is an implicit scale of relative authority: phonetics is 
considered to offer firmest and most scientific evidence; stylistic evidence is widely viewed 
as speculative, though the fresh scientificity of electronic corpus approaches may make 
stylistic evidence more reputable, if suitably presented; meaning evidence is regarded with 
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considerable scepticism, as being least stable and most difficult to establish. 
 
This scale of respectability of linguistic evidence correlates inversely with another scale: that 
of relative accessibility of public intuitions about usage. Phonetic evidence is valued most, 
because least in conflict with accessible (and expressible) speaker intuitions, which it easily 
illuminates and extends. Stylistic evidence highlights textual details or patterns which, again, 
are not readily perceived; aided by corpus searches, it can put numbers and tendencies to  
perceivable textual features. In the area of meaning, however, everyone has intuitions, which 
glide effortlessly between perceptions about usage and related beliefs, thoughts and 
prejudices; expert evidence in this domain is therefore more likely to come into conflict with 
self-confident judgements made by speakers about what their own language means.  
 
The poor prospects for meaning evidence are not helped by the fact that not all linguists, and 
hardly any lawyers, believe such evidence is beneficial. Some semanticists themselves argue 
that semantics is in general too contradictory and undeveloped a field to allow rigorous 
evidence or clear insights (Goddard, 1996). And legal practitioners typically maintain that 
little scope exists for semantic evidence for two further reasons. First, legal adjudications are 
based, as has been indicated above, on highly specialised notions of what meaning is ‘for the 
purpose of the law’; so much of what a linguist thinks of as meaning is, from a legal point of 
view, completely irrelevant. Second, meaning evidence tends to be perceived as an affront to 
the authority invested in judges, regulatory committees, and - begging fundamental questions 
about legal process -  a jury’s prerogative of reaching decisions unencumbered by prejudicial 
‘expert’ evidence. The sense conveyed by linguistic evidence that the meanings of utterances 
may be complex - and sometimes difficult to establish - can make such evidence seem merely 
perverse, and especially unappealing to English law and lawyers. 
 
However this may be, meaning investigations may become more complicated rather than less. 
In a rapidly expanding and diversifying media environment, serving increasingly 
heterogeneous, multicultural populations, the challenge presented by potentially divergent, 
niche or minority interpretations arrived at by specific regional or sub-cultural audiences is 
likely to become greater. Certainly, the complex demographic structuring of audiences 
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presents problems to accepted ideas of reception based on single or uniform moral principles, 
or social standards of conduct of the kind which underpin legal notions of ‘reasonableness’ or 
the ‘right-thinking person’. What is ‘reasonable’ needs to be established for a specified social 
group, rather than simply presumed as a sub-stratum of a culture as a whole. Sheer diversity 
of interpretive opinion seems likely to put increased pressure on the interpretive dimensions 







(1) It is possible that Shuy protests too much on the issue of ‘science’. The sort of 
discourse analysis he carries out, while undoubtedly impressive at a descriptive level, 
is often considered less scientific than many other areas of linguistic work. For a 
classic, sympathetic description of the general approach and method, however, see the 
final chapter of Stephen Levinson, Pragmatics (1983). 
 
(2) Strands in modern hermeneutics offer sophisticated understandings of intention in 
communication, for instance; and defences of the centrality of form in interpretation 
are the stock-in-trade of stylistics. For audience ethnography, see Morley (1992), or 
many of the essays collected in Hay, Grossberg and Wartella (1996). Richer models 
proposing relations or combinations between ostensive intention and inferential work 
carried out by the hearer can be found everywhere in linguistic pragmatics, from early 
insights of Paul Grice (cf Grice, 1989) through to Sperber and Wilson’s Relevance 
Theory  (Sperber and Wilson, 1986). In literary and cultural study, the first four, 
theoretical essays in Umberto Eco’s The Limits of Interpretation  (Eco, 1994) are 
highly persuasive on the respective roles of writer and reader. David Bordwell’s 
Making Meaning: Inference and Rhetoric in the Interpretation of Cinema (Bordwell, 
1989) convincingly explores comprehension and interpretation in film studies. A 
powerful attempt to extend insights of speech act theory into cultural analysis is John 
Searle, The Construction of Social Reality (Searle, 1995). Suggestive arguments 
presenting Relevance Theory as the core of an approach to cultural analysis which 
might be called an ‘epidemiology of representations’ can be found in Dan Sperber, 
Explaining Culture: A Naturalistic Approach (Sperber, 1996). 
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